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Comment
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: CAN THE UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AND
FEDERAL PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION
ACT OF 1980 EFFECTIVELY DETER IT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The kidnapping of children by parents has become a matter of
increasing public concern in recent years. Public attention was
focused on the parental kidnapping problem in 1976, with the
wide publicity given to the successive kidnappings of the
children of millionaire Seward Prosser Mellon, between the
mother's New York residence and the father's Pennsylvania
residence.' Also notorious was the case of Baby Lenore, who was
the subject of a custody battle between Florida and New York.'
There can be little disagreement with the proposition that a
child suffers when he is abruptly snatched from his home and
taken to unfamiliar surroundings, cut off from contact with his
primary caretaker-parent.3 Psychologists agree that a stable
home environment is essential to the emotional well-being of
1. See Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case
for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1012
n.5 (1977) (citing N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 7). Mr. Mellon was first
granted custody of his children by a Pennsylvania court in 1974. About a year
and a half later, Mrs. Mellon snatched the children to New York and was
awarded custody by the New York court in 1976. Mr. Mellon then snatched the
children from New York, while they were being watched by armed bodyguards.
Id.
2. Id. at 1012 n.4. Baby Lenore was placed with a potential adoptive fami-
ly shortly after her birth. The natural mother changed her mind before an adop-
tion order was entered, and instituted and won a habeas corpus action in New
York. Before the order was served on the adoptive parents, they moved to
Florida where the natural mother again brought a habeas corpus action. Florida
denied full faith and credit to the New York decree and awarded custody to the
adoptive parents. Id.
3. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 325-26 (1968); Modlin, Statement, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
319-22 (1968); Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 807, 812-13 (1944).
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children. 4 Yet, even though the paramount concern in a legal bat-
tle for custody is the best interest of the child,' the problem of
parental kidnapping arose in large part because of the will-
ingness of courts to entertain a kidnapping parent's petition for
a change in legal custody from the lawful custodian to himself.6
Even though detrimental to the welfare of the child, kidnapping
by a parent could lead to a second court award of custody, this
time to the kidnapper. A chance to relitigate the custody issue in a
potentially more favorable forum actually provided the incentive
for parents to snatch their children from the lawful custodian.
Public recognition of the problem has led to legislation on both
the federal level, by passage of the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act of 1980,7 and on the state level by adoption in forty-four
states of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.' These
acts are primarily designed to give interstate recognition to child
custody decrees in order to remove the forum shopping incen-
tive, promote the general welfare of children by limiting the cir-
cumstances in which courts can consider modifying an existing
custody decree, and thereby prevent the seemingly endless
relitigation of the custody issue.9
4. See generally Erikson, Growth and Crisis of the "Healthy Personality,"
in C. KLUCKHOHN, H. MURRAY & D. SCHNEIDER, PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIE-
TY AND CULTURE 185-225 (1955).
5. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541-42 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
In Halvey Justice Rutledge pointed out that the lack of a rule requiring that
full faith and credit be given to custody decrees "may set up an unseemly
litigious competition between the states and their respective courts as well as
between parents." Id. at 620. See also Hazard, May v. Anderson. Preamble to
Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959).
6. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, §§
6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A and scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as PKPA]. In particular, PKPA § 7(a)(3) provides in
pertinent part: "[Cjharacteristics of the law and practice in [custody] cases ...
contribute to a tendency of parties involved in such disputes to frequently
resort to the seizure, restraint, concealment, and interestate transportation of
children .... "
7. See note 6 supra.
8. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28 (9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 116 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT] (state variations of the
Uniform Act). The Act is codified in Pennsylvania at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5341-66 (Purdon 1981).
9. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 1 which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
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This Comment begins with a brief overview of the forum shop-
ping incentive for parental kidnapping, followed by a discussion
of the equitable clean hands doctrine incorporated in section 8 of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Two cases are
presented as examples of the use of section 8 by courts to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a custody case in favor of an
abducting parent. Stevens v. Stevens"° involves a kidnapping
parent's petition for an initial custody decree, and Zaubi v.
Zaubi1' a petition for modification of an existing foreign custody
decree. These cases are used to illustrate that judicial restraint
in a decision on whether to entertain a kidnapping parent's peti-
tion for custody can be an effective deterrent to parental kidnap-
ping. Finally, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,2
recently enacted by Congress, is described, and its interrelation-
ship with state law explained.
II. MOTIVATION FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING-BACKGROUND
To understand the various proposed solutions to the problem
of parental abductions and the way they are intended to operate,
it is necessary to first understand why parents resort to this
drastic measure in order to gain custody of their children.
High divorce rates, an increasingly mobile society, and recent
court recognition of parents' equal rights to custody together
have led to an increasing number of custody battles between
citizens of different states, and even different countries. Custody
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other
states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-
being;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the in-
terest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family rela-
tionships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children under-
taken to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state
insofar as feasible;
I& The PKPA contains provisions similar to those quoted above from the
Uniform Act. See PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(c).
10. 177 N.J. Super. 167, 425 A.2d 1081 (1981) (per curiam).
11. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
12. See note 6 supra.
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disputes are no longer primarily a matter of local concern, but
have become an interstate and international legal problem."3
Before the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Uniform
Act),14 any state could entertain the petition of its resident for
child custody, as long as the child and the parent were physically
present within its borders.15 Therefore, the parent who retained
physical custody of his child after the breakup of a marriage
could institute custody proceedings and have a two-fold advan-
tage: he could litigate the custody issue in the forum of his
choice, thereby taking advantage of the tendency of a court to
favor a local petitioner, and he could put the other parent to the
financial disadvantage of litigating in a distant forum. 6 If the
noncustodial parent was unable to bear the expense of foreign
litigation, the custody issue would be resolved without the
benefit of his appearance, and without the benefit of all informa-
tion relevant to determining which parent would be the better
caretaker. As long as the child and a parent were physically
13. PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(a)(1) states that Congress finds that:
there is a large and growing number of cases annually involving disputes
between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation of children
under the laws, and in the courts, of different States, the District of Co-
lumbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories and posses-
sions of the United States.
Id The Uniform Act applies to international abduction situations as well as in-
terstate abductions. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 23.
14. See note 8 supra. The Uniform Act was promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the
American Bar Association in 1968. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111 (1979).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT] provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the
custody, or to appoint a guardian, of the person of a child or adult
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state if the controversy
is between two or more persons who are personally subject to the
jurisdiction of the state.
Id
16. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive
Modifications, 65 CAL. L. REV. 978, 995 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer
I].
17. In personam jurisdiction over the parents was not required for jurisdic-
tion to decide the question of custody because the issue was not considered one
of parental rights to the child, but rather one of status of the child. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 79, Comment a at 295-97.
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present in the forum, for no matter how short a time, a court
could entertain a petition for custody and issue a decree on
whatever information it had available. 8
Once an initial custody decree was issued, the next step often
was for the losing parent to gain physical custody of the child by
abducting him from his home or school.19 He would then take the
child to his chosen forum to reside with him, with the benefit of
neither a court order nor the legal custodian's permission. There
was little to deter the abducting parent from thereafter petition-
ing his forum state court for a modification of the foreign
custody decree, hoping for a change in custody to himself. The
child's physical presence with one resident parent was normally
sufficient for a second court to find that it had jurisdiction to
modify the decree. 0
Once the second court decided that it had jurisdiction, there
was little to prevent it from redetermining the custody issue in-
dependent of any findings of fact made by the court in the state
of the initial decree. The United States Supreme Court had held
that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Con-
stitution2' did not bar the relitigation of the custody issue on
petition for modification of a foreign decree, nor did it mandate
recognition of a sister state's custody determination.' The only
prerequisite for modification of a custody decree was that the
petitioner assert that a change in circumstances had occurred
18. Bodenheimer'I, supra note 16, at 995.
19. The federal kidnapping statute expressly exempts parents from
criminal sanctions for abducting their own children. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976).
State kidnap statutes in general also exempt parents, following the historical
precedent that does not treat those with potential custodial rights as falling
within the definition of a kidnapper. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, OF
PUBLIC WRONGS: OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON 168 n.26 (1848). Parental kid-
napping was often condoned. See, e.g., Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136
N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956). For states which have recently placed
parental kidnappers within their kidnap statutes, see Fleck, Child Snatching By
Parents: What Legal Remedies for "Flee and Plea"?, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303,
313-15 (1979).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 79.
21. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1. See note 109 infra.
22. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604
(1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1947). See also Hudak, The Plight of the Interstate Child in American Courts,
9 AKRON L. REV. 257 (1975).
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after the initial decree. 23 Therefore, faced with the same set of
facts as were before the initial-decree court, the second court
could reach a different conclusion as to which parent would pro-
vide the better custodial household,' easily finding a change in
circumstances sufficient to order a change in custody.!5
With no real full faith and credit requirement, and with the
minimal burden of showing a change in circumstances, the peti-
tioner for modification had a good chance of relitigating the
custody issue. The only barrier to the modification petition
would be the clean hands doctrine." The court could decline to
exercise jurisdiction on the equitable ground that the petitioner's
act of abduction precluded him from seeking court intervention
in his request for custody. However, not all states had recog-
nized this principle as applicable in child custody cases, 7 and in
those that had, it was not consistently or predictably applied.'
The result of this often chaotic and confusing area of the law was
successive attempts by parents who were denied custody of their
children to abduct the children, take them to a potentially more
favorable forum, and seek a modification of the previous state's
decree.'
23. See generally Note, The Changed Circumstances Rule in Child Custody
Modification Proceedings, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 543 (1952).
24. The custody decision is often analogized to Solomon's choice. See, e.g.,
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer III; Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition
of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953) (decision of which household
would be better for the child is necessarily a subjective one, reflecting the per-
sonal views of the decision maker as to what is good for children) [hereinafter
cited as Interstate Recognition].
25. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 819, 828 (1944).
26. See 1 A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 286-90 (1954); Interstate
Recognition, supra note 24, at 357-69.
27. Pennsylvania has never recognized the clean hands principle as ap-
plicable in child custody cases. See Note, Jurisdiction - Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act - 1977 Pa. Laws No. 20. §§ 1-27, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 139, 143 n.25
(1978) and cases cited therein [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction].
28. Courts are reluctant to apply the principle when a denial of jurisdiction
based on the parent's wrongdoing may be detrimental to the child. Id. at 143 &
n.27.
29. See UNIFORM ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 111, 112 (1979). In describing the pre-Uniform Act custody law, the
drafters of the Act note that "[tIhere is no statutory law in this area and the
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To deter this conduct, both the Uniform Act" and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980' legislatively impose a full
faith and credit requirement of judicial determinations of
custody. In addition, incorporated into the Uniform Act is the
equitable clean hands doctrine.2
III. THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE - SECTION 8 OF THE
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT.
One major objective of the drafters of the Uniform Act was to
eliminate the situation where children are shifted from state to
state by parents seeking to find the forum most favorable to
their side of the custody dispute.' By vesting exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the state that is most likely to have information relevant
to determining which parent would provide best for the interest
of the child,' the Act makes the choice of forum independent of
where the child is physically located at the time the custody peti-
tion is filed. 5 In addition, section 8 of the Act gives legislative
definition to the clean hands doctrine, providing guidelines for a
court to determine whether it should entertain a petition for
custody by a parent who has abducted a child from his custodial
household without the consent of the custodial parent.' The re-
mainder of this discussion of the Uniform Act will focus on sec-
tion 8-the clean hands doctrine.
A. Pre-litigation Abductions-Section 8(a)
Section 8(a) deals with the situation where a parent, before an
judicial law is so unsettled that it seems to offer nothing but a 'quicksand foun-
dation' to stand on." Id. at 112. They also point out the irony of the result of
this chaos in that "persons who are good, law-abiding citizens are often driven
into these [child snatching] tactics against their inclinations; and that lawyers
who are reluctant to advise the use of maneuvers of doubtful legality may place
their clients at a decided disadvantage." Id, at 113.
30. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 13.
31. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(a).
32. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 8.
33. UNIFORM ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
111-14 (1979). See also Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975).
34. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 3.
35. See id A detailed discussion of the jurisdictional requirements of the
Act is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full discussion of the entire
Act, see Bodenheimer II, supra note 24.
36. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 8.
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initial custody decree has been made, "wrongfully" takes a child
from the physical custody of the other parent in one state, or
engages in "similar reprehensible conduct," and then petitions
the court of a second state for legal custody.37 Even if the abducting
parent can meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Act, the
court in the second state may decline to exercise jurisdiction
because of the petitioner's conduct, if the denial is "just and
proper under the circumstances. ' 3' Key words in section 8(a) are
"wrongfully taken" and "reprehensible conduct."
The question arises as to what constitutes a wrongful taking
when there has yet been no judicial determination of legal
custody. The drafters of the Uniform Act describe a wrongful
taking as "conduct which is so objectionable that a court in the
exercise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience
permit that party access to its jurisdiction. ' 39 This, however, ap-
pears to be a more adequate description of "reprehensible con-
duct," and is of little assistance in determining what would be a
wrongful taking.40 Additional guidance in interpreting this sec-
tion of the Act can be found in section 1(b) which provides that
the Act "shall be construed to promote its general purposes. 41
These purposes include "deterring abductions and other
unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards. '42 Therefore, any abduction could' be a wrongful taking
in the pre-decree situation, but the court is left with wide discre-
tion to determine whether to entertain the abductor's petition.43
The inclusion of section 8(a) in the Act indicates the intent of the
drafters that the question of a parent's abduction should enter
into the decision of whether to exercise jurisdiction over an ini-
tial custody petition.
37. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 8(a) provides: "If the petitioner for an ini-
tial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in
similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if
this is just and proper under the circumstances."
38. UNIFORM ACT, Commissioners' Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 143 (1979).
There is no definition of what constitutes "reprehensible conduct" in the Com-
missioners' Note.
39. Id
40. Id.
41. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § l(b).
42. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 1(a)(5).
43. The conclusion that the court is left with wide discretion follows from
the absence of a precise legal definition of the phrase "wrongfully taken."
Vol. 20:43
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1. Stevens v. Stevens44
The New Jersey Superior Court case of Stevens v. Stevens
provides an example of the use of section 8(a) as authority for a
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a kidnapper's peti-
tion for custody in the pre-decree situation. In Stevens, the child
resided with his father in Arizona after the mother and father
had separated. Before either parent filed for legal custody, the
mother forcefully snatched the child from Arizona and took him
to New Jersey without notice to the father.45 On the day of the
abduction, the father filed a petition for custody in Arizona. One
month later the mother filed a petition for custody in New
Jersey.46
In the New Jersey action the father moved to dismiss the
mother's petition for temporary custody, arguing that New
Jersey did not have jurisdiction under the Act. The motions
judge granted the dismissal, finding that under the Uniform Act
New Jersey should decline to exercise jurisdiction and defer to
Arizona because "the purpose of the Act was to avoid duplicate
custody litigation and removal of a child to another state to
establish jurisdiction. ' 47 The mother appealed this dismissal to
the superior court.
The appellate court reviewed the record and concluded that it
could decline to exercise jurisdiction under section 8(a) because
the mother wrongfully took the child and engaged in reprehensi-
ble conduct by forcefully snatching the child from Arizona. 48 Fur-
thermore, even if the jurisdictional requirements of the Act were
now met in New Jersey,49 they were only met because the
44. 177 N.J. Super. 167, 425 A.2d 1081 (1981) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 171, 425 A.2d at 1083. At the time of the abduction, the child was
in the care of a competent babysitter, in the sitter's home. The court noted that
the sitter had been physically assaulted by the mother at the time of the abduc-
tion. Id
46. Id. at 169, 425 A.2d at 1082.
47. Id at 170, 425 A.2d at 1082.
48. Id at 172, 425 A.2d at 1084.
49. Id. at 170-71, 425 A.2d at 1083. The court assumed, without finding,
that the mother might be able to invoke jurisdiction of the New Jersey court
under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Act, which provides in pertinent part:
A court . . .has jurisdiction . . .if:
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least
1981
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mother succeeded in snatching the child; therefore, entertaining
the mother's petition under these circumstances would frustrate
the very purpose of the Act, namely, deterring parental abduc-
tions. 0 Finally, the court noted that Arizona had been the child's
residence from birth until his abduction, and that the denial of
jurisdiction hardly seemed unfair because the parties could still
litigate the custody issue in Arizona."
Stevens illustrates how the language of section 8(a) retains the
equitable nature of the judicially created clean hands doctrine52
and incorporates the doctrine into the statute.53 If it is "just and
proper under the circumstances" to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a petition for 'n initial custody decree brought by an
abducting parent, a court may do so.' Whether the parent's con-
duct is reprehensible remains a decision for the court.
one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there
is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's pres-
ent or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships ....
Id. This is generally referred to as the significant connection/substantial
evidence basis for jurisdiction.
50. 177 N.J. Super. at 172, 425 A.2d at 1084. New Jersey could have declined
to exercise jurisdiction under the Uniform Act because a proceeding was pend-
ing in Arizona at the time of the New Jersey petition. See UNIFORM ACT, supra
note 8, § 6(a). In addition it should be noted that under these circumstances
Arizona would have more information concerning the child's welfare, and that
one month's residence in New Jersey would be unlikely to yield a great deal of
evidence in this regard. The Commissioners' Note to section 3 indicates that the
state with maximum contacts with the child should be the one to exercise
jurisdiction when two states can meet the section 3 requirements. UNIFORM
ACT, Commissioners' Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 124 (1979). See also
Bodenheimer II, supra note 24, at 1234. In addition, Arizona had not declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the father's petition there, so the New Jersey court
could have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of being an inconvenient
forum. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 7.
The paucity of cases using section 8(a) is understandable in view of the other
possible grounds for declining to exercise jurisdiction which would not
necessitate a finding of unclean hands. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, §§ 3(a),
6(a) & 7.
51. 177 N.J. Super. at 173, 425 A.2d at 1084. See Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or.
App. 129, 481 P.2d 91 (1978); Stubblefield v. Dong My Ha, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 751
(1978).
52. Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig of the University of California at
Berkley is credited with naming the doctrine. Interstate Recognition, supra
note 24, at 345. See UNIFORM ACT, Commissioners' Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
142 (1979).
53. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
54. Pennsylvania has uniquely altered section 8(a) in its version of the
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B. Post-decree Abductions - Section 8(b)
Section 8(b) of the Uniform Act deals with a parent who ab-
ducts his child in violation of an existing decree, then seeks
modification of the foreign decree in a new state.' This section
mandates, subject to one exception, that a court decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction in a petition for modification of a valid foreign
custody decree if the petitioner has "improperly removed" the
child from his lawful custodial household, or "improperly retain-
ed" the child after a visit, in violation of the existing foreign
custody decree. The exception in 8(b) is contained in the
prefatory language: "Unless required in the interest of the
child." The drafters of the Uniform Act indicate that this
interest-of-the-child exception should be applied only if "the harm
done to the child by a denial of jurisdiction outweighs the paren-
tal misconduct.
5'
The recent Pennsylvania case of Zaubi v. Zaubi57 illustrates an
interpretation of section 8(b) in light of the Act's overall purpose
of deterring parental abductions. The trial court's opinion' and
Uniform Act by replacing the phrase "reprehensible conduct" with "conduct in-
tending to benefit his position in a custody hearing." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5349(a) (Purdon 1981). This language explicitly incorporates the Act's general
purpose, to "deter abductions . . . undertaken to obtain custody awards," into
the clean hands section. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 1(a)(5); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5342(a)(5) (Purdon 1981).
Other states have also altered section 8(a) to leave less discretion to courts
faced with an initial decree petition by an abducting parent. See 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 143-44 (1979); ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.070 (1977) (mandates denial of
jurisdiction unless necessary in emergency to protect child); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.26 (Page 1980) (deletes "reprehensible").
55. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 8(b) provides:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner,
without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly re-
moved the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to
custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other tem-
porary relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner has violated
any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the cir-
cumstances.
Id See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5349(b) (Purdon 1981).
56. See UNIFORM ACT, Commissioners' Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 143
(1979).
57. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
58. Zaubi v. Zaubi, No. 39 (C.P. Greene, July 28, 1978).
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the supreme court dissent by Justice Nix show how the interest-
of-the-child exception can be used to avoid the mandatory
language prohibiting the exercise of modification jurisdiction in
the case of a parental abductor. In contrast, the superior court59
and supreme court"° majority opinions illustrate an interpretation
of the section that significantly narrows the grounds for using
the exception.
Initially it is significant to note that, before adoption of the
Uniform Act, Pennsylvania had not judicially recognized the
clean hands doctrine as applicable to custody disputes." Never-
theless, Pennsylvania not only legislatively adopted the doctrine,
but strengthened the language in the portion of 8(b) concerning
the denial of jurisdiction when the petitioner has violated some
provisions of a custody decree other than the provision that ac-
tually confers custody. Instead of allowing the court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction if it is just and proper under the cir-
cumstances, the Pennsylvania version imposes on the violating
petitioner the burden of showing "that conditions in the custodial
household are physically or emotionally harmful to the child." 2
Both the trial court and the superior court in Zaubi expressly
relied on section 8(b) to reach opposite conclusions on whether to
exercise modification jurisdiction.
1. Zaubi v. Zaubi
In Zaubi, the-mother of two small children had been originally
awarded temporary custody of the children by the courts of Den-
mark in an ex parte proceeding. 4 Thereafter the father in-
59. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 418 A.2d 729 (1980).
60. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980) (4-3 decision, Roberts & Larsen, JJ.,
concurring; Nix, J., dissenting).
61. See Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 143 n.25.
62. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5349(b) (Purdon 1981) provides in pertinent
part that "the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless the peti-
tioner can show that conditions in the custodial household are physically or
emotionally harmful to the child, the burden of proof being on the petitioner re-
questing the court to take jurisdiction."
63. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
64. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 297, 418 A.2d at 730. The provisions of the
Uniform Act as adopted by Pennsylvania apply equally to foreign countries and
sister states. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 23; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5365 (Purdon 1981).
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stituted a suit, in Denmark, for permanent custody of the
children. After a full hearing on the father's petition, the mother
was awarded custody. The father then appealed the decision
through the courts of Denmark. 5
While the father's final appeal to the highest court was pend-
ing, he took the children without the mother's permission or
knowledge, brought them to the United States, and concealed
their whereabouts for some nine months." The mother filed for a
writ of habeas corpus to obtain physical custody of the children
after determining that they were living with her former hus-
band's family in Pennsylvania.
Upon learning of the mother's petition, the father fled to Ohio
with the children. 7 A contempt citation was issued, after which
the father returned to Pennsylvania and a full hearing was had
with all parties present. In his answer to the petition, the
father sought modification of the Danish decree and a change in
custody. The father argued that the conditions in the mother's
household were dangerous to the welfare of the children because
the maternal grandfather had sexually abused the mother in her
childhood. He supported his argument with evidence that the
relationship of the grandfather to the children posed a threat of
his likewise sexually abusing them. 9
65. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 297-98, 418 A.2d at 730-31.
66. Id at 298, 418 A.2d at 731. The temporary custody award was granted
on April 8, 1975. The father instituted his suit shortly thereafter. In April,
1976, the lower court's order granting the mother custody was affirmed by the
highest appellate court of Denmark. When the mother obtained her final
divorce decree in June, 1977, the father again appealed to the High Court of
Denmark. The abduction occurred in August, 1977, while this appeal was pend-
ing, over two and one-half years after the initial temporary decree. Id. at
297-98, 418 A.2d at 730-31.
67. The father abducted the children in August, 1977, and the mother peti-
tioned for the writ in May, 1978. No. 39, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Greene July 28,
1978). During this time, the father had transferred the children between Ohio
and Pennsylvania. The children were not enrolled in school, and were kept
under close surveillance by the father's family. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 298, 418
A.2d at 731.
68. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 298, 418 A.2d at 731. The father's counsel, at the
first hearing on the writ, entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. No. 39, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Greene
July 28, 1978).
69. No. 39, slip op. at 8 & 9 (C.P. Greene July 28, 1978). The father also
argued that the mother was guilty of removing the children from the marital
residence in Ohio to Denmark, without the father's permission, before any
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After conceding that the Uniform Act required the Penn-
sylvania court to give full faith and credit to the Danish decree,"0
the trial court nonetheless held that it was required to examine
the evidence of sexual abuse and decide whether a modification
of the Danish decree should issue as in the best interest of the
children.71 The court relied on the Danish court's power to
"review the matters and circumstances as they now exist in a
fuller and more recent light"72 and reasoned that it had both the
power and the duty to do likewise. The court cited a pre-Act
case, Friedman v. Friedman," to support its perceived duty to
decide the custody question "on its own best judgment, unfet-
tered but not necessarily uninfluenced by a prior adjudication.7 4
Recognizing that the Uniform Act has neutralized much of that
earlier doctrine, the court nonetheless found that it could modify
the decree if "the present circumstances of the child's custody
[are] of such a nature as to amount to a state of emergency vitally
jeopardizing his or her physical, emotional, or mental well
being.""5 The trial court then reviewed all the evidence" and,
despite the Danish court's decision that this evidence did not
support the father's argument that the grandfather's conduct
posed a substantial threat of sexual abuse, held that a return of
physical custody to the mother would jeopardize the welfare of
the children." The court therefore modified the Danish decree
and awarded custody of the children to the father."
The court recognized that the father's abduction of the
children from Denmark was a wrongful taking, and that section
custody proceedings. The court held that "she violated no law nor decree when
she did so." Id. at 7.
70. Id. at 6. The trial court relied on its earlier decision that full faith and
credit is required even if the forum which issued the decree had not adopted
the Uniform Act, as long as the decree "was made under factual circumstances
meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act." Id at 6 (quoting Com-
monwealth of Pa. ex reL, Scott Alan Moyers, No. 149 (C.P. Greene Aug. 1977).
71. No. 39, slip op. at 10 (C.P. Greene July 28, 1978).
72. Id.
73. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 530, 307 A.2d 292 (1974).
74. No. 39, slip op. at 9 (C.P. Greene July 28, 1979) (quoting 224 Pa. Super.
Ct. at 533, 307 A.2d at 295 (1974)).
75. No. 39, slip op. at 10 (C.P. Greene July 28, 1978).
76. Id at8&9.
77. Id at 10.
78. Id at 12.
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8(b) of the Uniform Act would apply. 9 In the court's view,
however, its duty of "protecting these children from an interna-
tional tug of war," in light of the interest-of-the-child exception in
section 8(b), required it to exercise jurisdiction; the danger to the
children required it to modify the foreign decree."
The superior court found error in the trial court's modification
of the Danish decree in the absence of the father's showing that
conditions in the custodial household had changed after the ini-
tial decree and had become physically or emotionally harmful to
the children. The court held that the only changed circumstance
in this case was that the father had abducted the children in
violation of a valid foreign custody decree.8 In the court's view,
the burden of changed circumstances requires that the petitioner
for modification of a valid decree show that "the court issuing
the original decree was not acting in the child's best interest."82
Noting that none of the father's evidence of threatened sexual
abuse by the grandfather involved instances occurring subse-
quent to the final Danish custody decree, the court reasoned that
the Danish court had considered this evidence and found that it
did not warrant any change in custody.8" The superior court
found error in the trial court's refusal to defer to the finding of
fact the Danish court that there was little actual threat of
harm. 4
The superior court weighed the father's misconduct against
the potential for abuse by the grandfather in the mother's
household, and found that the misconduct outweighed the mere
possibility of abuse by the grandfather, who was not residing in
the children's home." Using section 8(b) of the Uniform Act and
the Commissioners' Note,88 the court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to modify the Danish decree under these cir-
cumstances. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's
modification in favor of the father, ordered the children returned
to the mother, and authorized her to take the children to Den-
mark. 7
79. Id. at 6 & 7.
80. Id. at 7 & 8.
81. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 299, 418 A.2d at 731.
82. Id. at 300, 418 A.2d at 732.
83. Id. at 301, 418 A.2d at 732.
84. Id. at 302, 418 A.2d at 733.
85. Id.
86. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
87. 275 Pa. Super. Ct. at 304, 418 A.2d at 734.
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On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
superior court's order.88 In construing Pennsylvania's version of
section 8(b) of the Uniform Act, the court stated:
We agree with the Superior Court that the Act compels
Pennsylvania courts not only to recognize valid custody
decrees from foreign nations but also to deline to accept
jurisdiction to modify custody decrees in the absence of a
showing, based on evidence not previously considered, of
conditions in the custodial household that are physically or
emotionally harmful to the children. 9
To support its conclusion that the petitioner must meet with new
evidence his burden of showing dangerous conditions in the
custodial household, the supreme court cited section 13 of the
Uniform Act, which makes the custody decree conclusive as to
all issues of law and fact decided.90 The majority agreed with the
superior court that the 'father had not met his burden in the
case .
91
Writing in dissent, Justice Nix noted that Pennsylvania had
home state jurisdiction because the children had lived with their
father in Pennsylvania for more than the requisite six months.92
He then disagreed with the majority's conclusion that section
8(b) precluded the exercise of jurisdiction to modify the Danish
decree. Referring to section 8(b)'s interest-of-the-child exception,
the dissent argued that the legislature did not intend that the
court decline to exercise jurisdiction when the child would suffer
as a consequence.93
Because he believed that section 8(b) did not preclude the
court from exercising modification jurisdiction,94 Justice Nix next
88. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
89. Id. at 185-86, 423 A.2d at 334.
90. Id. at 190, 423 A.2d at 336.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 199, 423 A.2d at 341 (Nix, J., dissenting). None of the other opin-
ions in Zaubi mentioned the section 3 basis for jurisdiction. The home state re-
quirement was met because the father had successfully abducted the children
and successfully concealed their whereabouts for the requisite six month time
period. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 3.
93. Id. at 202, 423 A.2d at 343 (Nix, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 203, 423 A.2d at 343 (Nix, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on
the use of the term "petitioner" in referring to the party with unclean hands in
section 8(b) to support his conclusion that, when the modification issue is raised
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addressed the issue of whether the court had modification
jurisdiction under section 14 of the Uniform Act. 5 Section 14 pro-
vides that a Pennsylvania court may not modify a foreign
custody decree unless the foreign court no longer meets the
Act's jurisdictional prerequisites and the Pennsylvania court has
jurisdiction. 8 Based on his decision that Pennsylvania now had
home state jurisdiction,97 he concluded that the Danish court no
longer had jurisdiction to modify its own decree. 8 Pennsylvania,
therefore was the only state with jurisdiction to modify the
decree.
Finally, the dissent disagreed that the trial court erred in
making its own independent judgment of the propriety of the
award of custody to the mother based on the same facts con-
sidered by the Danish court. In Justice Nix' view, because a
Pennsylvania court petitioned for enforcement of its own decree
would be required to review the entire record and make an in-
dependent judgment on the custody issue, full faith and credit
would not require the court to give more deference to a foreign
decree than to a decree of its own state.9 Any other interpreta-
as a defense to an enforcement action, the clean hands section should not apply.
Id The Federal Act removed this problem by substituting the term "contes-
tant." See note 132 and accompanying text infra.
95. 492 Pa. at 204, 423 A.2d at 344 (Nix, J., dissenting).
96. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 14. The Commissioners' Note to section
14 describes the situation where children are abducted and their whereabouts
not discovered by the legal custodian for "several years," and states that "[tihe
abductor would be denied access to the court of another state under section 8(b)
and state 1 [the decree state] would have modification jurisdiction in any event
under section 3(a)(4)." Commissioners' Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 154-55
(1979). See Grubs v. Ross, 291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981). For criticism of
allowing an abductor to establish home state jurisdiction because of his abduc-
tion and concealment, see Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 392 (1980).
97. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
98. 492 Pa. at 205, 423 A.2d at 344 (Nix, J., dissenting). It is not clear that
Denmark no longer had jurisdiction to modify its own decree based on section
3(a)(2), because it would appear that it still had a significant connection with the
mother and child, and substantial evidence concerning the child would be
available in Denmark. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 3(a)(2); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN § 5344(a)(2) (Purdon 1981).
99. 492 Pa. at 205-06, 423 A.2d at 344-45 (Nix, J., dissenting). Both the
Uniform Act and the Pennsylvania Act provide that "[a]s to these parties the
custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to
the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified
pursuant to law including the provisions of this Act." UNIFORM ACT, supra note
8, § 12; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5353 (Purdon 1981). Because the dissent con-
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tion of the legislation would, according to the dissent, "lose sight
of the cardinal precept in the custody area, to wit: the best in-
terest of the child.' ' 0
C. Judicial Restraint
The majority opinion in Zaubi represents the kind of judicial
restraint that is essential for the clean hands provision of the
Uniform Act to be effective in deterring parental kidnapping. It
clearly defines the changed circumstances necessary before a
court can entertain a parental abductor's request for a change in
custody after a foreign jurisdiction has granted custody to the
other parent. It is the abductor's burden to show that conditions
in the custodial household have changed after the foreign decree
and have become dangerous to the child.10 ' Cases decided before
the Act cannot be relied on as precedent for entertaining a peti-
tion for modification of a foreign decree. The Act has substantial-
ly narrowed the discretionary power of Pennsylvania courts to
modify foreign decrees, legislatively imposed the equitable clean
cluded that it could modify the Danish decree pursuant to the Uniform Act, it
did not view this section as barring a review of the entire record, including the
evidence considered by the Danish court. 492 Pa. at 205 & n.13, 423 A.2d at 344
& n.13 (Nix, J., dissenting). See also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
100. 492 Pa. at 206, 423 A.2d at 345 (Nix, J., dissenting). After the supreme
court affirmed, suit was brought in federal district court charging that enforcing
the Danish decree and allowing the mother to take the children out of the coun-
try was a denial of the children's constitutional rights as United States citizens.
Zaubi v. Hoejme, No. 80-1567 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1980). The distict court
dismissed the complaint because entertaining the petition would have a disrup-
tive effect on the custody issues, creating a change in circumstances which
would result in relitigation of the custody issues. Id at 6 & 8. Also, there exists
a long standing proscription against the intervention of federal courts in
domestic relations cases. Id. at 5.
The plaintiff then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit for an injunction and stay of the superior court's order granting
the mother permission to remove the children from the United States. Judge
Aldisert, writing for the court, ordered a stay pending a decision on the injunc-
tion petition, but the mother could not be served. The appeal was nevertheless
argued and the district court's judgment affirmed. Zaubi v. Hoejme, No. 80-2679
(3d Cir. May 12, 1981).
This writer contacted counsel for the mother and learned that subsequent to
the mother's return to Denmark, her son disappeared and was believed to have
been again snatched by the father, whose whereabouts were unknown.
101. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
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hands doctrine, and mandated full faith and credit to foreign
decrees as to conclusions of both law and fact.
Even though the uniform version of the Act does not define the
petitioner's burden as explicitly as does Pennsylvania's version,102
the Zaubi result can be reached if section 8 is interpreted in
light of the Act's general purpose of deterring unilateral removal
of children from their lawful custodian. 3 If courts refuse to exer-
cise modification jurisdiction in favor of an abducting parent ex-
cept in the most extraordinary circumstances, the incentive for
parents to engage in this detrimental conduct will be significantly
diminished. On the other hand, if the old, flexible, changed-cir-
cumstances rule is retained, the abducting parent can frequently
show that something has changed, either in his household or in
the previous custodial household, and the court can decide again
which household would best serve the interest of the child. This
would defeat the Act's express purpose of avoiding relitigation
of custody decisions of other states, and would lead to a continu-
ing round of abductions and relitigations.
IV. THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT OF 1980
A. Introduction: Rationale for Federal Intervention in
Interstate Custody Disputes
In Zaubi, the legal custodian sought enforcement of her
foreign custody decree in a state that had adopted the Uniform
Act. As of February 10, 1981, the Uniform Act had been adopted
in forty-four states, leaving six states that had not legislatively
required their courts to give full faith and credit to foreign
custody decrees. 4 These remaining states were thus potential
102. Compare note 37 supra with note 62 supra.
103. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1980); Grubs v.
Ross, 291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981). For an interesting reverse situation,
where the party with unclean hands petitions in the decree state, see Bosse v.
Superior Ct., 89 Cal. App. 3d 440, 152 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1979) (holding that the
Uniform Act does not cover this; defer to the custodial parent's new home state
and dismiss the petition in the decree state).
104. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2228 (1981). The six states which had not
legislatively adopted the Uniform Act include: Massachusetts (adopted judicial-
ly, Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1980)), Mississippi, New Mexico,
South Carolina, Texas (which has legislation similar to the Uniform Act), and
West Virginia. The District of Columbia and Puerto Rico also had not adopted
the Uniform Act. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2228 (1981).
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havens for would-be parental abductors. Kidnapping parents
could still flee to a non-adopting state, file a petition for custody,
and obtain a de novo consideration of the basic custody issue
before a court with potentially different views of what is best for
the children. 1°5 The incentive for kidnapping would not be effec-
tively removed unless no jurisdiction would provide a forum for
relitigation of the custody issue.
Impressed with the magnitude of the parental kidnapping
problem,' and impatient with the slow process of individual
state adoption of the Uniform Act,'017 Congress recently attempted
a federal solution to the problem. Despite the long-standing
policy of avoiding federal intervention in domestic relations
cases,1"8 Congress approved limited federal intervention in this
area.
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution'0 9 gives Con-
gress the authority to prescribe the effect that one state's
judicial decisions will have in another state. Under this authori-
ty, Congress has the power to remove the incentive for child ab-
ductions by simply mandating that all states give full faith and
credit to custody decrees of sister states. This is precisely what
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (Federal Act) is
designed to do."0 Accordingly, the Federal Act requires that full
faith and credit be given to the child custody determinations of
sister states."'
In addition to its full faith and credit provisions, the Federal
105. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
106. PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(a)(1). It is estimated that over 100,000 parental
kidnappings occur annually. Pick, Kidnapped!, STUDENT LAW Oct. 1980, at 28
[hereinafter cited as Pick].
107. Eighteen of the current 44 states which have adopted the Uniform Act
have done so between 1979 and 1981, even though it was promulgated in 1968.
See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 8 (Supp. 1981).
108. Federal courts have invoked the domestic relations exception whenever
possible to avoid federal involvement in domestic relations cases. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1977).
109. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."
110. See PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(c)(5), which is identical to UNIFORM ACT,
supra note 8, § l(a)(1).
111. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8.
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Act provides for assistance to legal custodians who are unable to
locate the kidnapping parent and children. ' Because a state act-
ing alone is limited in its ability to aid a resident in locating a
kidnapping parent who flees its jurisdiction, federal assistance in
this area was deemed an essential part of the solution to the
parental kidnapping problem."' Limited state power contributes
to the tendency of parties in a custody dispute to seize, restrain,
and conceal the children involved. This has a disruptive effect on
the occupations and commercial activities of the parties involved
and interstate commerce generally."4 Therefore, pursuant to its
commerce clause power, Congress has approved the use of both
the Parent Locator Service"5 and the FBI"' to aid in locating
parental abductors.
B. Legislative History of the Federal Act
As early as 1973, bills were introduced in Congress" 7 to ex-
tend federal and FBI authority to child-snatching cases."8 These
first proposals were defeated primarily because of the reluctance
of legislators and law enforcers to classify parental kidnapping
112. PKPA, supra note 6, § 9-10.
113. PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(b) provides: "[I]t is necessary to establish a na-
tional system for locating parents and children who travel from one such
jurisdiction to another and are concealed in connection with such disputes ... 
114. PKPA, supra note 6, § 7(3) provides:
[T]hose characteristics of the law and practice in such cases, along with
the limits imposed by a Federal system on the authority of each such
jurisdiction to conduct investigations and take other actions outside its
own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of parties involved in such
disputes to frequently resort to the seizure, restraint, concealment, and
interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court orders, ex-
cessive relitigation of cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts
of various jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so
expensive and time consuming as to disrupt their occupations and com-
mercial activities.
Id.
115. PKPA, supra note 6, § 9(b).
116. PKPA, supra note 6, § 10.
117. See Comment, Prevention of Child Stealing: The Need for a National
Policy, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 829, 861 (1978).
118. Id. The 1973 bill would have made child stealing by a parent a misde-
meanor. See 123 CONG. REC. H1479 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). In 1975, a bill was
introduced in the House to remove the parental exception in the federal Kidnap
Act. See H.R. 113, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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as a federal crime."' Subsequent proposals were drafted in order
to provide a deterrent, avoid harsh criminal penalties, and still
confer authority for FBI assistance in tracing abducted
children.'
The first bill incorporating the full faith and credit and
jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Act was introduced in
the Senate in 1978, by Senator Wallop, as an amendment to the
Senate's Criminal Code Reform Act.' 2' The Reform Act was passed
by the Senate on January 30, 1978, but later stalled in con-
ference and committee. The Wallop proposal was then appended
to the Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1980,
which was passed by the House" but subsequently failed to pass
in the Senate. In the closing days of the 96th Congress, Senator
Wallop offered the proposal as a rider to the Pneumococcal Vac-
cine Medicare Coverage legislation. 23 The Pneumococcal Vaccine
Act was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on
December 28, 1980124 with the rider intact. The rider is the
Federal Act, which is contained in sections 6 through 10 of the
Pneumococcal Vaccine Act.'
C. Provisions of the Federal Act
1. Full Faith and Credit
The Federal Act mandates that full faith and credit be given
to child custody determinations of sister states.26 If the initial
119. H.R. 988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 123 CONG. REC. H54 (daily ed.
Jan. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Moss).
120. Speaking to the Senate on the Wallop proposal, Senator Thurmond
stated: "The new section is drafted so as to deal less harshly and more effec-
tively with such offenses." 124 CONG. REC. S502 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
121. Id. at S499-500. This proposal contained criminal provisions not con-
tained in the Federal Act as ultimately enacted.
122. 67 A.B.A. J. 704 (1981).
123. 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2904 (1981).
124. Pub. L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980).
125. The Act was not to become effective until July 1, 1981. Id. at 3567.
There may be some question about whether Congress intended to delay the ef-
fective date of the PKPA as well. See, e.g., 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2353 (1981).
126. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(a) provides: "The appropriate authorities of
every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as
provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another state."
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decree state has exercised jurisdiction in conformity with the
jurisdictional requirements of the Federal Act"' (which are iden-
tical to those contained in section 3 of the Uniform Act),"2 8 then a
second state must enforce and not modify this custody decree.'"
The second state may modify the initial decree only if it satisfies
these requirments, and the decree state no longer has jurisdic-
tion or has declined to exercise its jurisdiction to modify the
decree.'' °
Initially, a question arises about whether the remaining states
need to adopt the Uniform Act as a matter of state law in view
of the federally mandated full faith and credit provisions of the
Federal Act. Significantly, the Federal Act does not contain the
procedural guidelines necessary to assure a complete solution to
the problem faced by a custodial parent when the other parent
has kidnapped the children. 31 In particular, there is nothing in
the Federal Act relating to how the custodial parent is to regain
custody of the children. This is a procedural matter that should
be handled as a matter of state law.
There is also no provision equivalent to the Uniform Act sec-
tion 8 clean hands principle. The only explicit mention of a sanc-
tion for parental abductions is contained in a section that en-
courages states to assess the costs of litigation and enforcement
of a valid custody decree against a contestant who has wrongful-
ly removed the child from the physical custody of his lawful
custodian, or wrongfully detained the child after a visit.'3 Con-
127. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(a).
128. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 3.
129. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(a).
130. Id
131. The Uniform Act provides these guidelines in section 15 (Filing and En-
forcement of Custody Decree of Another State), section 16 (Registry of Out-of-
State Custody Decrees and Proceedings), and section 17 (Certified Copies of
Custody Decree). UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, §§ 15-17.
132. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(c) provides in pertinent part:
State courts are encouraged to-
(2) award to the person entitled to custody or visitation pursuant to a
custody determination which is consistent with the provisions of such sec-
tion 1738A, necessary travel expenses, attorneys' fees, costs of private in-
vestigations, witness fees or expenses, and other expenses incurred in
connection with such custody determination in any case in which-
(A) a contestant has, without the consent of the person entitled to
custody or visitation pursuant to a custody determination which is consis-
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gress has thereby enunciated its view that parental kidnappers
should be discouraged, but has left it to the states to define the
strength of the policy against this conduct, leaving them free to
decline to exercise jurisdiction by reason of the conduct of a peti-
tioner.' 3
There is only one provision in the Federal Act requiring a
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, even though it may meet
the requirements: when there is a custody proceeding pending in
another state which meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
Federal Act.3 4 Otherwise, there are no guidelines such as those
contained in the Uniform Act for when a state should decline to
exercise jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum. 35 The Uniform
Act, therefore, is still needed in order that the states can pro-
vide a uniform and consistent policy for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion when a parent has been guilty of kidnapping his children.
Finally, there is no provision in the Federal Act that requires
that decrees rendered by foreign countries be afforded full faith
and credit, although the Uniform Act contains a provision cover-
ing its international application.' 6 It is doubtful that such a pro-
vision could be included in federal legislation under the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution. 37 However, the Hague Con-
vention has completed a final draft of the text of a treaty on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions, with twenty-
seven countries, including the United States, participating in its
drafting. The draft will be presented to Congress for approval in
the near future,138 and will be a step toward solution of the inter-
national kidnapping problem.
tent with the provisions of such section 1738A, (i) wrongfully removed the
child from the physical custody of such person, or (ii) wrongfully retained
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical
custody; or
(B) the court determines it is appropriate.
Id
133. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 8.
134. PKPA, supra note 6, § 8(a).
135. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 7.
136. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 23.
137. See note 109 supra.
138. See 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2185 (1981). A final draft of the Hague Con-
vention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abductio, has been prepared to
require ratifying countries to return children who have been taken by one
parent from their residence country. State Department officials have been
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2. Parent Locator Service
In order to utilize the Uniform Act's provisions for enforce-
ment of a valid custody decree, the legal custodian must first
know in which state the abducting parent is residing with the
children.139 Before the Federal Act, parents were forced to hire
private investigators to locate their children. 140 Now, they may
be able to avoid this cost by using the already established
Parent Locator Service (PLS). The PLS has been available for
locating parents who disappear and fail to make child support
payments."' Section 9 of the Federal Act extends this service to
parents who request it for the purpose of enforcing state or
federal law prohibiting the unlawful taking or restraining of a
child, or for the purpose of making or enforcing a child custody
determination. 4 ' It is significant to note that the PLS is thus
available both to a parent seeking an initial custody decree and
to one seeking to enforce an existing decree."4 This is essential
for the parent who seeks a custody decree in a state having
jurisdiction, so that he can comply with the due process provi-
sion requiring that notice of the action be given to the other
parent.'"
The only information that can be obtained through the PLS is
the most recent address and place of employment of any absent
parent or child, if it is contained in any files or records main-
tained by the Department of Health and Human Services, or if it
can be obtained by the Department under its authority to obtain
authorized to sign the tentative draft of the treaty for the United States, but it
still would have to be ratified by the Senate. There is some question of what
federal legislation would be needed to implement the treaty should it be
ratified, and whether a state or federal agency should supervise its operation.
Id at 2185-86. See also Foster & Freed, A Legislative Beginning to Child-
Snatching Prevention, TRIAL, April 1981, at 38 [hereinafter cited as Foster &
Freed].
139. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 6, § 4 (notice provision).
140. See, e.g., Pick, supra note 106, at 54.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976).
142. PKPA, supra note 6, § 9(b).
143. PKPA, supra note 6, § 9(b) provides that requests for information shall
be honored "when such information is to be used to locate such parent or child
for the purpose of (1) enforcing any State or Federal law with respect to the
unlawful taking or restraint of a child; or (2) making or enforcing a child
custody determination." (emphasis added).
144. See PKPA, surpa note 6, § 8(a); UNIFORM ACT, supra note 8, § 4.
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such information from any other department or agency of the
state or federal government.145
3. FBI Assistance
Title 18, section 1073 of the United States Code, entitled
"Flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony,"'46 makes it a
federal crime for a person to move or travel in interstate or
foreign commerce with the intent of avoiding prosecution under
the laws of the place from which he flees. The Federal Act
amends this section to include "cases involving parental kidnap-
ping and interstate or international flight to avoid prosecution
under applicable state felony statutes.""' 7 It will have no effect
when the child is abducted from a state in which there are either
no criminal laws prohibiting child-snatching by a parent, or in
which such an offense is not designated a felony." 8
In the situations where an abduction is from a state which
classifies child-snatching as a felony, section 1073 must be ex-
amined to determine the scope of federal intervention. Section
1073 provides for prosecution only upon formal approval in
writing by the Attorney General or an assistant attorney
145. PKPA, supra note 6, § 9(b).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent
either (1) to avoid prosecution ... under the laws of the place from which
he flees, for a crime ... which is a felony under the laws of the place from
which the fugitive flees . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. The Federal Kidnapping Act specifically excludes parents from its provi-
sions. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976).
147. PKPA, supra note 6, § 10(a).
148. Only about half the states make child snatching a felony. Foster &
Freed, supra note 137, at 37. Pennsylvania designates child snatching a misde-
meanor in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904 (Purdon 1973) which provides in per-
tinent part:
(a) Offense defined.-A person commits an offense if he knowingly or
recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 years from the
custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, when he has no
privilege to do so.
(b) Defenses.-It is a defense that:
(3) the actor is the child's parent or guardian or other lawful custo-
dian and is not acting contrary to an order entered by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
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general of the United States. 19 In order to encourage the Justice
Department to comply with the spirit of this provision, the
amendment of section 1073 further requires the Attorney General
to report to Congress data concerning the number of applications
for complaints under this section pertaining to parental kidnap-
pers, the number of complaints issued, and other data relating to
steps taken by the Attorney General to comply with the intent of
Congress in this regard.',' This reporting requirement indicates
that Congress intends that the Justice Department actively
assist parents in locating abductors, despite the Department's
stated reluctance to interfere in domestic relations cases. 51
Because interstate or international flight with a child in viola-
tion of state law is now a federal offense, the FBI has the
authority to intervene in attempting to locate the parental ab-
ductor. Whether or not this authority will be exercised remains
to be seen.5 2 Nevertheless, the provision may be an effective, ad-
ditional deterrent to a parent contemplating the abduction of his
children. The mere threat of federal prosecution may provide a
powerful disincentive to would-be abductors.'-
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 together have the potential
for providing an effective deterrent to parental kidnapping, and
should go far toward preventing the harm done to children by
over-zealous parents who would resort to extra-legal means of
obtaining custody. The clean hands provision of section 8 of the
Uniform Act, as interpreted in Pennsylvania, provides a power-
ful disincentive for any parent contemplating both a child-
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
150. PKPA, supra note 6, § 10(b). The report of the Attorney General is due
within 120 days of the enactment of section 10. Id.
151. Testimony of United States Deputy Attorney General John C. Keeney
before the Subcommittee on Crime of the United States House df Represen-
tatives' Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in Cal. Dep't. of Justice, Report
to the Legislature-ACR 236, Appendix 3 (1975). See also Bodenheimer I, supra
note 16, at 1003; Foster & Freed, supra note 137, at 37; Pick, supra note 108, at
30.
152. See Foster & Freed, supra note 137, at 38 (section 10 of the PKPA is of
limited help in the absence of a court order or warrant).
153. Id.
1981
Duquesne Law Review
snatching, and ultimately, a petition for legal custody. The
Federal Act provides a disincentive for the parent who would at-
tempt to conceal his whereabouts in order to retain de facto
custody of his children after a child-snatching.
If the remaining states act quickly to adopt the Uniform Act,
and if the Pennsylvania lead in interpreting section 8 is followed
by other jurisdictions,"M the parental abductor will not be able to
invoke the jurisdiction of his haven state. Instead, if the legisla-
tion works as it was intended, the parent with the custody
decree will have federal assistance in locating the abductor, and
then will be able to enforce his decree in any state where the
children can be found. In addition, the lawful custodian will not
be required to prove again his superior fitness as a parent in
order to regain custody, absent a significant change in cir-
cumstances after the decree issued, and before the abduction.
Therefore, the primary source of the parental kidnapping prob-
lem can be eliminated by this combined legislation, provided it is
interpreted in light of its express purpose-to deter parental ab-
ductions.
Rita Mankovich Irani
154. For recent state cases denying jurisdiction in cases of parental abduc-
tion, see Etzion v. Evans, 247 Ga. 390, 276 S.E.2d 577 (1981); Grubs v. Ross, 291
Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981); Pratt v. Pratt, No. 80-509 (R.I. June 12, 1981).
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